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A GROSS INJUSTICE:  
PROVING AGE DISCRIMINATION BY 
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS UNDER  
THE ADEA IN THE WAKE OF  
GROSS V. FBL FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. 
CHRISTINE R. LEWIS† 
“Especially in the employment field, discrimination based on 
age is cruel and self-defeating; it destroys the spirit of those who 
want to work and it denies the Nation[] the contribution they 
could make if they were working.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
“I’d be better off with someone younger,” says the supervisor 
to the fifty-three year old post office employee during her sixty 
day evaluation.  Shocked and offended, the employee gets up and 
leaves, slamming the door on her way out.  The next day, when 
the employee reports to work for her shift, she is informed that 
she has been let go, and that she must pack her things and leave 
immediately.  The cause given for her termination is 
insubordination—treating a supervisor in an unprofessional 
manner—in violation of company policy.2  Was age a cause of this 
employee’s termination?  Probably.  Was age the cause of this 
employee’s termination?  Probably not. 
 
 
 
† Notes and Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D., 2013, St. John’s 
University School of Law; B.S., 2010, Fordham University. Thank you to Professor 
Adam Zimmerman for all of his guidance and patience, and to AUSA David Eskew 
for introducing me to Gross. This Note would not exist without their help, and I am 
grateful to both of them. A very special thank you to Lisa Ann Lewis for a lifetime of 
editing with love. 
1 H.R. REP. NO. 93-913, at 40 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2849. 
2 See Harley v. Potter, 416 F. App’x 748 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied sub nom. 
Harley v. Donahoe, 132 S. Ct. 844 (2011). The facts of Harley are reproduced here in 
a modified version for illustrative purposes. 
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The “baby boomers,” those seventy-five million individuals 
born between 1946 and 1964, are impacting today’s workplace 
statistics in a tremendous way.3  There are approximately sixty-
nine million American workers over the age of forty in today’s 
workforce.4  In the private sector, approximately 45.3% of the 
workforce is between fourty and sixty-one years old.5  This 
percentage is far greater among federal employees, with 64.1% of 
workers falling within this age group.6  Both of these percentages 
are significantly higher than they were merely a decade ago.7  As 
the average age of the American worker rises, so too does the 
prevalence of age discrimination in the workplace.  Between 2007 
and 2008, there was a 30% increase in the number of age 
discrimination claims brought against employers in the United 
States.8 
The measures in place to protect against age discrimination 
in the workplace have become increasingly important as their 
applicability has come to cover a greater percentage of 
employees.  One such measure is the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (the “ADEA”).9  In enacting the ADEA, 
Congress’ purpose was “to promote employment of older persons 
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age 
discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and 
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact 
of age on employment.”10  The Act’s implications are far-reaching.  
 
3 Ann Marie Tracey, Still Crazy After All These Years? The ADEA, the Roberts 
Court, and Reclaiming Age Discrimination as Differential Treatment, 46 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 607, 607 (2009); see also Marilyn Geewax, For Baby Boomers, the Job Market’s 
Even Worse, NPR (May 1, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php? 
storyId=126426518. 
4 The Aging Workforce in America, IMEC, http://imecred.imec.org/imec.nsf/All/ 
Aging_Workforce (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
5 STUART GREENFIELD, CTR. FOR STATE & LOCAL GOV’T EXCELLENCE, PUBLIC 
SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: THE CURRENT SITUATION 1 (2007), available at 
http://slge.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Public-Sector-Employment_Greenfield. 
pdf. 
6 Id. 
7 FREDRICA D. KRAMER & DEMETRA S. NIGHTINGALE, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 
EMP’T & TRAINING ADMIN., AGING BABY BOOMERS IN A NEW WORKFORCE 
DEVELOPMENT SYSTEM iii (2001), available at http://www.doleta.gov/Seniors/ 
other_docs/AgingBoomers.pdf. 
8 Steve Vogel, EEOC Examines Age Discrimination as Numbers of Claims Rise, 
WASH. POST (July 16, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ 
article/2009/07/15/AR2009071503760.html. 
9 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
10 Id. § 621(b). 
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The ADEA applies to all employers with twenty or more 
employees, “including federal, state, and local governments, and 
prohibits discrimination against a person over the age of forty 
because of his or her age with respect to any term, condition, or 
privilege of employment, including hiring, firing, promoting, 
laying off, compensation, benefits, job assignments, and 
training.”11  Different sections of the ADEA apply to different 
types of employers.  Section 623 (“the non-federal provision”) 
applies to all non-federal employers,12 while § 633a (“the federal 
provision”) applies solely to federal employers.13   
Although the ADEA is fairly clear as to whom it applies and 
the types of adverse actions it protects against, how it should be 
enforced at the judicial level has proven to be more ambiguous.  
Specifically lacking from the ADEA is a description of the type of 
causation that a plaintiff must demonstrate when bringing a 
claim.  In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,14 the Supreme 
Court interpreted the ADEA in an attempt to clarify this 
uncertainty.  Relying closely on the statutory language of the 
non-federal provision—under which the claim in Gross was 
brought—the Court held that “a plaintiff bringing a disparate-
treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of 
the challenged adverse employment action.”15  A mixed-motive 
analysis, comparable to that used in Title VII discrimination 
cases and used by many courts when faced with ADEA claims, 
was deemed inadequate.16  Under the § 623 non-federal 
provision, age must be the reason an employee is treated 
adversely, not just one reason amongst many.17 
However, in clarifying the causation standard to be used in 
§ 623 non-federal claims, the Court cast further uncertainty upon 
the causation standard to be used in § 633a claims against 
federal employers.  In Gross, the Court made no reference to 
 
11 Jeffrey S. Klein et al., Employee Selection, in 38TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON 
EMPLOYMENT LAW 2009, at 1005 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook 
2009). 
12 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
13 Id. § 633a (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
14 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
15 Id. at 180. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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§ 633a, focusing solely on § 623 and its precise language.18  It 
remains unclear what type of causation the federal provision 
requires; thus, various courts have interpreted Gross’ impact on 
§ 633a differently.  Some courts have found that Gross should be 
extended to cover § 633a and federal employers, while others 
have found that it should not, and many have applied it to 
federal employers with no discussion of Gross’ relevance 
whatsoever.19 
This Note argues that the “but-for” causation required under 
Gross should not be extended to apply to ADEA claims brought 
against federal employers because the reasoning of Gross does 
not support a broad expansion of its holding, and because a less 
stringent burden of proof is more appropriate in the federal 
employment context.  Part I explains the current requirements 
placed on a plaintiff bringing a § 623 ADEA claim against a non-
federal employer, as laid out by the Supreme Court in Gross.  
Part II explores the applicability of Gross to § 633a of the ADEA, 
which applies to federal employers, and compares the reasoning 
of those courts that have chosen to apply Gross in the federal 
employment context with that of those courts that have refrained 
from doing so.  Finally, Part III proposes that Gross should not be 
expanded to require “but-for” causation in claims brought against 
federal employers under § 633a of the ADEA for a number of 
statutory interpretation and policy reasons, and instead 
recommends a “substantial factor” causation test in which age 
must be material to an adverse employment action, but need not 
be the “but-for” cause. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Employment discrimination in the American workforce is a 
long recognized and heavily litigated issue, and protections 
against it come from a variety of different sources, including 
common law and both state and federal statutes.20  Congress has 
acknowledged that “ ‘[d]iscrimination based on age . . . can be as 
great an evil in our society as discrimination based on race or 
religion or any other characteristic which ignores a person’s 
unique status as an individual and treats him or her as a 
 
18 Id. at 170. 
19 See infra Part II. 
20 Klein et al., supra note 11, at 1001. 
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member of some arbitrarily-defined group.’ ”21  This section first 
describes the ADEA, the statutory basis of most age 
discrimination claims, and then discusses the implications of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the ADEA in Gross v. FBL 
Financial Services, Inc. 
A. Statutory Protection Against Age Discrimination: The ADEA 
The statute that takes center stage in the battle against age 
discrimination is the ADEA.  First enacted in 1967, the ADEA 
has been protecting workers from discrimination for over forty 
years.22  It applies to all workers over the age of forty in the 
private sector, as well as in local, state, and federal 
government.23  The breadth of this protected class helps to 
identify and resolve many age-related issues. 
Section 623 of the ADEA prohibits age discrimination by 
non-federal employers.  In relevant part, it states that “[i]t shall 
be unlawful for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment because of such individual’s age.”24 
Section 633a of the ADEA prohibits age discrimination by 
federal employers.  In relevant part, it states that: 
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for 
employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . in military 
departments . . . , in executive agencies . . . , in the United 
States Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory Commission, in 
those units in the government of the District of Columbia 
having positions in the competitive service, and in those units of 
the judicial branch of the Federal Government having positions 
in the competitive service, in the Smithsonian Institution, and 
in the Government Printing Office, the Government 
Accountability Office, and the Library of Congress shall be 
made free from any discrimination based on age.25 
 
 
 
21 H.R. REP. NO. 93-913, at 40 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2811, 2849 
(quoting a Presidential message supporting an extension of ADEA in March 1972). 
22 29 U.S.C. § 623 (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
23 Klein et al., supra note 11. 
24 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
25 Id. § 633a(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (emphasis added). 
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Despite Congress’ attempt to protect employees through this 
legislation, enforcing the ADEA at the judicial level has been 
problematic.26  Questions involving the burden of persuasion to 
be used and type of causation required have been particularly 
troubling.  When interpreting the ADEA, courts have often 
looked to another Civil Rights era statute, Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), for guidance.  “Title VII covers 
employers with 15 or more employees, and prohibits employers 
from making adverse employment decisions based upon an 
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”27  
Because both the ADEA and Title VII are intended to prevent 
discrimination in the workplace, albeit different types of 
discrimination, courts have often drawn analogies between the 
two and borrowed from the jurisprudence of one when 
interpreting the other.28 
The ADEA and Title VII “inform each other in important 
ways.”29  Up until 2010, one such way was the type of causation 
analysis that courts required in both cases.30  Many courts used 
the burden shifting analysis established in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins31 in both ADEA and Title VII cases.  Under the Price 
Waterhouse analysis, used where there is direct evidence of 
discrimination, a plaintiff has to prove that discrimination played 
a motivating role in an adverse employment action.32  Where this 
is established, the defendant then has the opportunity to prove 
that the adverse employment action still would have occurred for 
a different reason, even if the discriminatory motive had not been 
present.33  Such proof can serve as an affirmative defense for the 
 
26 See Tracey, supra note 3, at 608. (“[A]s now interpreted, the ADEA is 
confusing, convoluted, and problematic.”). 
27 Klein et al., supra note 11, at 1001. 
28 See, e.g., Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 359 (8th Cir. 2008) 
(applying a Title VII analysis in an ADEA case), rev’d, 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
29 Tracey, supra note 3, at 609. 
30 See Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–75 (banning the Price Waterhouse analysis in 
ADEA cases). 
31 490 U.S. 228 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the Court specified that the 
analysis it set forth was not technically burden shifting, but instead an initial 
burden placed on the plaintiff which may be rebutted through what is “most 
appropriately deemed an affirmative defense.” Id. at 246. However, in later cases, 
including Gross (to be discussed shortly), the Court references the Price Waterhouse 
“burden-shifting framework,” so this Note utilizes the same language in discussing 
this concept. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–74. 
32 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244–45. 
33 Id. 
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accused employer.34  Although Price Waterhouse involved sex 
discrimination under Title VII,35 courts nonetheless used the 
burden shifting analysis in both the ADEA and Title VII 
contexts.36  This allowed a plaintiff to succeed on a claim where 
age was not the “but-for” cause of an adverse employment action, 
but merely “a factor in the employment decision at the moment it 
was made,” so long as the employer could not prove that the 
employee would have been negatively impacted in the same 
manner for some other reason.37  Even “a mixture of legitimate 
and illegitimate considerations” could serve as adequate proof of 
discrimination.38  However, all of this changed with the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc. 
B. Judicial Interpretation of the ADEA: Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc. 
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Court put a 
swift end to the use of the mixed-motive analysis in ADEA § 623 
claims by instead requiring a showing of “but-for” causation in all 
§ 623 claims.39  In Gross, the plaintiff, Jack Gross, began working 
for FBL Financial Group (“FBL” or “the company”) in 1971.40  
Gross worked for the company for over thirty years, and rose to 
the position of “claims administration director.”41  However, in 
2003, when Gross was fifty-four years old, he was reassigned to 
the position of “claims project coordinator.”42  Many of his former 
responsibilities were given to the newly appointed “claims 
administration manager,” a woman in her early forties who had 
previously been supervised by Gross.43  FBL stated that “Gross’ 
reassignment was part of a corporate restructuring” and  
 
 
 
34 Id. at 246. 
35 Id. at 231–32. 
36 See, e.g., Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 571–72 (6th 
Cir. 2003); Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 64 (1st Cir. 2000); 
Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 n.6 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the Eighth 
Circuit has applied the Price Waterhouse analysis to age discrimination claims). 
37 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240–41. 
38 Id. at 241. 
39 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
40 Id. at 170. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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explained that Gross’ new position was “better suited to his 
skills.”44  Gross “considered [his] reassignment a demotion 
because of FBL’s reallocation of his former job responsibilities.”45 
In 2004, Gross filed suit in federal district court alleging a 
violation of his rights under the ADEA.46  Applying the mixed-
motive burden shifting framework, the jury in the district court 
found that age was a motivating factor in Gross’ reassignment 
and awarded him $46,945.47  FBL then appealed the verdict to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, citing 
an improper jury instruction.48  On appeal, the Eighth Circuit 
found that the jury had improperly applied the Price Waterhouse 
framework, which is used in Title VII cases and which the Eighth 
Circuit, at the time, also applied to ADEA cases.49  The court 
found that Gross had failed to provide “ ‘[d]irect 
evidence’ . . . ‘sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable fact 
finder that an illegitimate criterion actually motivated’ the 
adverse employment action.”50  Because Gross had not met his 
initial burden of providing “direct evidence,” FBL never should 
have been given the opportunity to prove that the illegitimate 
factor was of no consequence in the decision.51  The Eighth 
Circuit, therefore, found that the jury instruction below had been 
flawed and remanded the case for a new trial.52 
Gross then appealed the reversal, and the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.  In a 5-4 opinion, the majority opted not to use 
the standard of proof set out by either the district court or the 
Eighth Circuit and instead laid down a different causation 
requirement.53  The Court held that “a plaintiff bringing a 
disparate-treatment claim pursuant to the ADEA must prove, by 
a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the ‘but-for’ cause 
of the challenged adverse employment action.”54 
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 See id. at 171. 
48 Id. at 171. 
49 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 557 
U.S. 167 (2009). 
50 Id. at 359 (quoting Thomas v. First Nat’l Bank of Wynne, 111 F.3d 64, 66 (8th 
Cir. 1997)). 
51 Id. at 360. 
52 Id. at 358. 
53 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 180 (2009) 
54 Id. 
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The first step in the Court’s analysis was to definitively rule 
out the Price Waterhouse burden shifting framework.55  The 
Court clarified that the Price Waterhouse analysis should be 
limited to the Title VII context and should never play a role in 
§ 623 ADEA claims.56  The majority cautioned that “[w]hen 
conducting statutory interpretation, we ‘must be careful not to 
apply rules applicable under one statute to a different statute 
without careful and critical examination.’ ”57  Furthermore, the 
Court reasoned that, because Congress specifically amended Title 
VII to provide that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin 
used as a “motivating factor” would suffice to prove causation but 
failed to make the same amendment to the ADEA’s language, 
Congress did not intend for the same standard to apply in the 
ADEA context.58 
After outlining why a “motivating factor” test should not be 
used, the Court’s second step was to establish the type of 
causation test that should be used in § 623 ADEA claims.59  The 
Court set forth a strict “but-for” causation requirement.  In order 
to meet the burden of proving “but-for” causation, a party must 
show that in the absence of a precipitating event, a later event 
simply would not have occurred.60  Unlike the “mixed-motive” 
test, which considers an event a motivating factor—and therefore 
a cause—so long as it “played a part or a role” in a decision,61 the 
“but-for” test demands a much closer relationship between one 
event and another.  Simply playing a role is not enough. 
Additionally, under the “but-for” test, the materiality of the 
precipitating event is of no relevance.  No matter how important 
or wrongful a given event is, it is not the “but-for” cause unless 
the result would not have occurred in its absence.  This lack of a 
materiality inquiry differentiates the “but-for” test from a 
“substantial factor” test.  A substantial factor test, discussed in 
depth in Part III.B, weighs how material an event is in 
 
55 Id. at 173. 
56 Id. at 174 (“This Court has never held that this burden-shifting framework 
applies to ADEA claims. And, we decline to do so now.”). 
57 Id. (quoting Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)). 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 175–76. 
60 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 
265 (5th ed. 1984). 
61 Gross, 557 U.S. at 171. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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contributing to a given result.62  If one event is a “material 
element” in bringing about another event, it will be considered its 
cause.63  Materiality is of the utmost importance. 
In the context of age discrimination, a “but-for” causation 
requirement means that age must be the “ ‘reason’ that the 
employer decided to act.”64  A claim “ ‘cannot succeed unless the 
employee’s protected trait actually played a role in [the 
employer’s decisionmaking] process and had a determinative 
influence on the outcome.’ ”65  In short, “but-for” causation means 
that the adverse action would not have occurred unless 
discrimination was present.66 
In Gross, the Court’s primary reason for distinguishing the 
ADEA from Title VII was the difference in statutory language 
between the two.  Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas relied 
extensively on the different language used by the drafters of the 
ADEA.  Turning to the dictionary to define “because of,” Thomas 
concluded that “the ordinary meaning of the ADEA’s requirement 
that an employer took adverse action ‘because of’ age is that age 
was the ‘reason’ that the employer decided to act.”67 
Four justices dissented, and Justice Stevens and Justice 
Breyer authored the two dissenting opinions.  All four dissenting 
justices joined in Justice Stevens’ opinion,68 while all but Justice 
Stevens joined in Justice’s Breyer’s opinion.69  Justice Stevens 
vehemently argued that it is not clear by its plain meaning that 
“because of” means “but for.”70  He focused largely on the 
similarities between the ADEA and Title VII and the courts’ 
earlier treatment of similar language in Title VII as allowing 
proof of a mixed motive to be sufficient.71  He felt that the mixed- 
 
 
 
 
62 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
63 See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 
45, 49 (Minn. 1920). 
64 Gross, 557 U.S. at 176. 
65 Id. (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993)) (explaining 
Hazen). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. at 190 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 180–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. at 180–83. 
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motive approach should continue to be used in ADEA claims and 
that the “Court’s resurrection of the but-for causation standard 
[was] unwarranted.”72 
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Breyer also felt that the mixed-
motive analysis should be used in age discrimination cases.  
Justice Breyer focused on the inadequacies of a “but-for” test, 
arguing that because of the intangible nature of age 
discrimination, proof of a mixed motive should suffice to prove 
causation.73  He saw no problem with the jury instruction in 
Gross that made age a motivating factor, and therefore a cause, if 
it “played a part or a role in the defendant’s decision.”74  A “but-
for” determination was not necessary in his opinion. 
II. CIRCUIT SPLIT: APPLYING GROSS TO § 633A 
In the wake of Gross, courts have split over the applicability 
of Gross’ holding to ADEA § 633a claims.  A majority of courts, 
including the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, have 
extended Gross’ “but-for” requirement to claims against federal 
employers.  Within this group, most courts have extended the 
holding without acknowledging that it might not be applicable.  A 
smaller contingency within the majority has acknowledged the 
potential difference, but reasoned that Gross should still be 
extended to the federal claims in question.  Other courts, 
including the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, have 
declined to extend Gross to claims against federal employers.  
This minority has cited the differences between the governing 
sections of the ADEA as the reason for not requiring a showing of 
“but-for” causation against federal employers. 
A. Extending Gross 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is among those 
courts that have applied Gross to a claim against a federal 
employer without acknowledging that it might be inapplicable.  
In Harley v. Potter,75 the court upheld the application of Gross in 
a case against the Unites States Postal Service, an entity 
 
72 Id. at 187. 
73 Id. at 190–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
74 Id. at 192. 
75 416 F. App’x 748, 752 (10th Cir. 2011) (“The district court properly identified 
Gross as the controlling legal standard.”). 
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expressly governed by § 633a rather than § 623.76  Wanda Harley 
was fired from her position as a post office employee after 
refusing to sign an evaluation with which she disagreed.77  
Another employee testified that Wanda’s supervisor had stated 
that he “needed somebody younger.”78  At trial, Harley was 
required to prove that her age was the “but-for” cause of her 
termination.79  The fact that her age was a motivating factor in 
the firing was not enough.80  Because Harley did not prove that 
she would not have been fired but for her age, she lost.81  By 
affirming the lower court’s use of the “but-for” analysis, the 
Tenth Circuit silently extended Gross, requiring a “but-for” 
causation showing against federal and non-federal employers 
alike. 
Similarly, several district courts have applied Gross in 
claims against federal employers, which should be governed by 
§ 633a rather than § 623.  These federal employers include a V.A. 
Hospital,82 the United States Army,83 the United States Small 
Business Administration,84 the United States Army Corp of 
Engineers,85 and the FDIC.86  None of these courts acknowledged 
that the employers in question were governed by a section of the 
ADEA that was never addressed in Gross.  They all made their 
decisions with the understanding that Gross was the applicable 
standard to be used in all ADEA cases, regardless of whether the 
employer was a federal or non-federal entity. 
 
76 29 U.S.C. § 633a (2006 & Supp. III 2009) (“All personnel actions affecting 
employees or applicants for employment who are at least 40 years of age . . . in the 
United States Postal Service and the Postal Regulatory Commission . . . shall be 
made free from any discrimination based on age.”). 
77 Harley, 416 F. App’x at 750. 
78 Id. at 749–50. 
79 Id. at 750–51. 
80 Id. at 751 (“While Harley’s age was one of many reasons . . . for her 
termination, Harley has not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that her age 
was the ‘but-for’ cause of her termination. Harley simply has not shown that her age 
was the reason for her termination.”). 
81 Id. at 753–4. 
82 Frankel v. Peake, Civ. No. 07-3539 (WJM), 2009 WL 3417448, at *3−4 (D.N.J. 
Oct. 20, 2009). 
83 Shelley v. Geren, No. CV-08-5045-RHW, 2009 WL 3783159, at *3 (E.D. Wash. 
Nov. 6, 2009). 
84 Guerrero v. Preston, No. H-08-2412, 2009 WL 2581568, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 
18, 2009). 
85 Wagner v. Geren, No. 8:08 CV 208, 2009 WL 2105680, at *4−5 (D. Neb. July 9, 
2009). 
86 Glenn v. Bair, 643 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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Other district courts have acknowledged that Gross did not 
interpret § 633a but have made it clear that they are nonetheless 
choosing to extend Gross’ holding to federal employers.  In 
Reynolds v. Department of the Army, a New Jersey district court 
discussed the applicability of Gross, despite the fact that “[t]he 
parties [did] not dispute the applicability of Gross’ ‘but-for’ 
causation requirement.”87  The court noted that “the ADEA 
contains two distinct prohibition sections, one applicable to non-
federal employers, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a), and one applicable to 
federal employers, § 633a(a). . . . The ADEA provision at issue in 
Gross, however, dealt strictly with the non-federal employer 
provision which has markedly different statutory language.”88  
Nonetheless, because a majority of district courts had chosen to 
extend the Gross holding, the Reynolds court ultimately decided 
to do the same.89 
B. Limiting Gross 
Other courts have declined to extend Gross to § 633a claims, 
acknowledging the differences between §§ 623 and 633a, and the 
fact that the Supreme Court’s analysis was limited to only the 
former.  In Ford v. Mabus, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia declined to require a “but-for” showing in a claim 
brought against the United States Navy.90  The plaintiff, Richard 
Ford, was denied a promotion, and the position was instead given 
to someone twenty-five years younger than Ford.91  One of the 
supervisors involved in the hiring process allegedly made a 
comment about the negative impact the aging workforce was 
having on the Navy.92  At trial, the district court found that Ford 
had not met his burden of showing that his age was the “but-for” 
cause of his firing, and therefore found in favor of the 
government.93 
The court of appeals remanded the case to determine if “age 
was a factor in the Navy’s decision to deny [Ford] the 
promotion.”94  Relying on statutory language, much as the Court 
 
87 No. 08-2944 (FLW), 2010 WL 2674045, at *10 (D.N.J. June 30, 2010). 
88 Id. at *10 n.5. 
89 Id. 
90 629 F.3d 198 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
91 Id. at 200. 
92 Id. at 200–01. 
93 Id. at 200. 
94 Id. at 207. 
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in Gross did, the Ford court reasoned that the language in the 
two sections of the statute could not be read to have the same 
plain meaning.  “[B]ecause of” in § 623 does not mean the same 
thing as “based on” in § 633a.95  The court of appeals held that 
“while a § 623 plaintiff must, as Gross holds, show that the 
challenged personnel action was taken because of age, a § 633a 
plaintiff must show that the personnel action involved ‘any 
discrimination based on age.’ ”96  A “but-for” test was therefore 
deemed inappropriate. 
Many district courts have also declined to expand Gross into 
the federal setting, relying primarily on the different language of 
the two relevant statutory provisions of the ADEA.  In Fuller v. 
Gates, the District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
determined that “but-for” causation should not be required in a 
suit brought against the Secretary of Defense.97  In Torres v. 
McHugh, the District Court for the District of New Mexico held 
that “Gross is inapplicable to the federal employer provision 
which contains different statutory language.”98  Both the Fuller 
and Torres courts reasoned that Gross’ application should be 
limited to those cases involving the statutory provision of the 
ADEA that the Supreme Court actually interpreted in Gross, 
§ 623.99 
For the reasons discussed in Part III below, the approach 
taken by the Ford, Fuller, and Torres courts is the more 
appropriate of the two.  By declining to extend Gross to federal 
employers, these courts are truer to the language of the statute, 
and to the holding of Gross itself. 
III. THE INAPPLICABILITY OF “BUT-FOR” CAUSATION AND THE 
BENEFITS OF A “SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR” TEST 
The first part of this section describes the reasons why Gross 
should not be extended to § 633a federal employer cases, relying 
on norms of statutory interpretation and policy considerations.  
 
95 Id. at 205. 
96 Id. 
97 No. 5:06-CV-091, 2010 WL 774965, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 1, 2010) (“The 
language of § 633a(a) compels the court to conclude that a mixed-motive analysis 
continues to apply in claims against the government.”). 
98 701 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1222 (D.N.M. 2010). However, the Torres court 
reluctantly applied “but-for” causation because of other binding Tenth Circuit 
precedent obligating it to do so. Id. at 1222–23. 
99 Id. at 1222; Fuller, 2010 WL 774965, at *1. 
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The elements of statutory interpretation discussed include the 
plain meaning of the language used in § 633a as compared to 
§ 623, the structure of § 633a as compared to § 623, and the 
structure of the ADEA generally.  The policy considerations 
discussed include the additional remedies available to federal 
employers and the historical notion that federal workers are held 
to a higher standard than their private counterparts. 
Having explained why Gross’ “but-for” causation standard 
should not be used, the second part of this section proposes an 
alternative “substantial factor” causation test.  Such a test would 
be truer to the language of § 633a and diminish many of the 
policy concerns raised by a “but-for” test. 
A. Gross Should Not Be Extended To Apply to § 633a 
The norms of statutory interpretation suggest that § 623 
should be understood differently than § 633a.  There is a long 
accepted method for interpreting federal statutes.  Courts first 
look to the statute’s textual plain meaning, then to statutory 
structure, and then to sources outside the four corners of the 
statute itself.100  In this case, all of these factors suggest that 
§ 633a should not be interpreted to mean the same thing as 
§ 623. 
The first step in this process is to look at the statutory 
language in light of “its textual plain meaning, as gleaned from 
ordinary usage, dictionaries, grammar, and linguistic canons.”101  
Ironically, Gross itself is an excellent example of the proposition 
that courts will look to the plain meaning of the words of a 
statute when construing its meaning.102  In Gross, the Court said 
that “ ‘[s]tatutory construction must begin with the language 
employed by Congress and the assumption that the ordinary 
meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative 
purpose.’ ”103 
 
 
100 William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2042 
(2006) (book review) (summarizing William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, 
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990)). 
101 Id. (emphasis added). 
102 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 175 (2009). 
103 Id. (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 
246, 252 (2004). 
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The plain meaning of § 623 was established by the Supreme 
Court in Gross.  The § 623 ADEA language in question makes an 
adverse employment action illegal where the action takes place 
“because of [an] individual’s age.”104  After consulting a 
dictionary, the Court determined that the plain meaning of 
“because of” is “by reason of,”105 which in turn requires a showing 
that but for the employee’s age, the adverse employment action 
would not have occurred.106 
Section 633a uses different language than § 623, and 
therefore cannot automatically be read as having the same plain 
meaning.  Instead, the actual language used must be interpreted.  
“[I]t is through the ‘dint of . . . phrasing’ that Congress speaks, 
and where it uses different language in different provisions of the 
same statute, we must give effect to those differences.”107  Where 
Congress uses different language within the same statute, as was 
done here, it can be assumed that it did so intentionally.  While 
§ 623 bans discrimination “because of [an] individual’s age,”108 
§ 633a bans “any discrimination based on age.”109  Merriam-
Webster’s, the Supreme Court’s dictionary of choice in Gross,110 
defines “any” as “one or some indiscriminately of whatever 
kind.”111  As the Court has previously stated, “[r]ead naturally, 
the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some 
indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ”112  Where Congress uses the 
word “any” without adding additional language to modify it, its 
breadth remains unlimited.113  The type of discrimination covered 
under § 633a is therefore very extensive. 
 
 
 
104 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008). 
105 Gross, 557 U.S. at 176. 
106 Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63–64 (2007). 
107 Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
108 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). 
109 Id. § 633a(a) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
110 Gross, 557 U.S. at 176. 
111 Any Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/any (last visited March 18, 2013). 
112 United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (quoting Webster's Third New 
International Dictionary 97 (1976)). 
113 See Ford v. Mabus, 629 F.3d 198, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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Furthermore, “based on” means “to . . . form a foundation 
for.”114  Something serves as a foundation for an action when it is 
an integral or substantial part of the action upon which other 
factors are added.  The foundation is not necessarily the 
determinative element, but it is nonetheless important to the 
action.  An action is based on a given element when that element 
is a fundamental reason behind it. 
Coupled together, the plain meaning of § 633a’s freedom 
from “any discrimination based on age” is that employees shall be 
free of “whatever kind” of age discrimination, so long as age is 
the foundation upon which the discrimination is based.  Section 
633a’s plain language, therefore, suggests a causation analysis 
different from the “but-for” test put forth in Gross for use with 
§ 623.  While § 623 protects against age discrimination in a 
certain limited context, § 633a is much more expansive in the 
type and degree of age discrimination that it protects against.  
Because “any” and “based on” are more inclusive than “because 
of,” it follows that a greater degree of discrimination should be 
included.  A less stringent showing of discrimination would 
therefore suffice.  A substantial factor test is one way this burden 
could be established, as will be discussed in the following section. 
In addition to plain meaning, courts also look at sentence 
structure and syntax.  Sections 623 and 633a contain a structural 
difference that sets them apart, as noted by the Court of Appeals 
in Ford v. Mabus.  “Because of” in § 623 modifies “to fail or refuse 
to hire,” whereas “based on” in § 633a modifies 
“discrimination.”115  In practice, this means that “while a section 
623 plaintiff must, as Gross holds, show that the challenged 
personnel action was taken because of age, a section 633a 
plaintiff must show that the personnel action involved ‘any 
discrimination based on age.’ ”116  Once again, the plain meaning 
of the statute suggests that the federal employee provision offers 
a more expansive form of protection than does its non-federal 
counterpart.  “Recognizing the ‘sharp[]’ difference between these  
 
 
114 Base, v.3, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/ 
Entry/15856 (last visited March 18, 2013). The Oxford English Dictionary is used 
here rather than Merriam-Webster’s, used by the Court in interpreting § 623, 
because Webster’s definition of “based” was self-referential (“to serve as a base for”) 
and less helpful. 
115 Ford, 629 F.3d at 205. 
116 Id. 
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two provisions, the Supreme Court in Gomez-Perez v. Potter 
described section 633a as a ‘broad, general ban on discrimination 
based on age,’ ” as compared with the more lenient § 623.117 
The next source that federal courts generally turn to in 
construing statutory meaning is the “statutory structure.”118  
Much like the plain meaning of the language and structure of the 
provisions, this factor too suggests that §§ 623 and 633a should 
be treated differently.  On the issue of statutory structure, the 
Supreme Court has previously stated that §§ 623 and 633a are 
completely independent provisions, which do not substantively 
affect one another.119  Section 633a is “self-contained and 
unaffected by other sections” of the ADEA.120  Therefore, the 
Court’s interpretation of § 623 should not have an impact on 
§ 633a, and the same test need not be used in both sections. 
The fact that Congress enacted separate sections for federal 
and non-federal employers in the ADEA should not be 
overlooked.  The original ADEA did not apply to federal 
employers.121  In 1972, an amendment was introduced that would 
have expanded the language of § 623 to include federal 
employers.122  One of the reasons given for the amendment by the 
bill’s author, Senator Bentsen, was the “subtle” discrimination 
against “Federal employees who [were] ignored or harassed by 
their superiors.”123  Before passage, the bill was restructured “to 
remove the federal government from the general definition of 
employer and to place appropriate substantive provisions in a 
separate section.”124 
Ultimately, Congress added an entirely new section to the 
ADEA in order to specifically address the distinctive problem of 
age discrimination in federal employment.125  Section 633a was 
created to apply solely to federal employers, and Congress chose 
not to use the same language in that section as it had in § 623.  
 
117 Id. (quoting Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 486, 488 (2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
118 Eskridge, supra note 100. 
119 Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 166–67 (1981). 
120 Id. at 168. 
121 Bornholdt v. Brady, 869 F.2d 57, 65–66 (2d Cir. 1989). 
122 Id. 
123 118 Cong. Rec. 7745 (1972) (statement of Sen. Bentsen). 
124 Bornholdt, 869 F.2d at 66; 118 Cong. Rec. 15,894–95. 
125 See Lehman, 453 U.S. at 166–67 (comparing the applicability of jury trials to 
each of the provisions). 
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The fact that Congress gave federal employers their own 
subsection suggests that they are held to a different standard, 
which prevents them from being grouped together with everyone 
else in § 623. 
Section 633a also gives special consideration to federal 
employees when it comes to bringing their claims, which is not 
mirrored in § 623.  Even before the ADEA was enacted, federal 
discrimination claims were dealt with through the Civil Service 
Commission (the “CSC”), providing federal employees with a 
great deal of protection that was not available outside of the 
federal context.126  After the ADEA was passed and amended to 
cover federal employees, “Congress empowered the CSC ‘to 
enforce the provisions of [§ 633a(a)] through appropriate 
remedies.’ ”127  Today, § 633a(b) specifies that the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (the “EEOC”) is 
authorized to enforce the ADEA.128  Only federal employees are 
entitled to have their claims heard by this committee. 
The fact that federal employees are given a different channel 
through which to bring their claims suggests that Congress did 
not intend §§ 623 and 633a to function in the same way.  As 
Chief Justice Roberts stated in his dissent in Gomez-Perez v. 
Potter, “civil service is a complex issue, requiring ‘careful 
attention to conflicting policy considerations’ and ‘balancing 
governmental efficiency and the rights of employees.’  The 
resulting system often requires remedies different from those 
found to be appropriate for the private sector (or even for the 
States).”129  The difference in available remedies shows Congress’ 
acknowledgment that federal employees should be judged by a 
different set of standards. 
All of these statutory interpretation factors suggest that 
§§ 623 and 633a should be kept separate and distinct. 
Policy considerations also suggest that the two sections 
should be treated differently.  There is a history in the United 
States of holding federal employers to a higher standard than 
their non-federal counterparts simply because they are federal 
employers.  The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (the “CSRA”) 
 
126 Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 500–01 (2008). 
127 Id. at 501. 
128 29 U.S.C. § 633a(b) (2006 & Supp. III 2009). 
129 Gomez-Perez, 553 U.S. at 500 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted) 
(quoting Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 388, 389 (1983)). 
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offers one such example.130  The CSRA states that “in order to 
provide the people of the United States with a competent, honest, 
and productive Federal work force reflective of the Nation’s 
diversity, and to improve the quality of public service, Federal 
personnel management should be implemented consistent with 
merit system principles and free from prohibited personnel 
practices.”131  The Act then goes on to lay out a merit-based 
system for career advancement with federal employers.132  This 
Act applies only to federal employees, suggesting that Congress 
was not concerned with furthering similar competence, honesty, 
and productivity in the private sector.  It is only federal 
employers that are held to this legislatively created higher 
standard. 
The federal government, by way of being the sovereign, is 
responsible for the well-being and protection of every American 
in a way that non-federal entities are not.  The federal employers 
previously mentioned, such as the Army, Navy, and Corp of 
Engineers, all do critical work.  Where age discrimination within 
one of these organizations denies an opportunity to the most 
qualified individual because of his or her age, the effect is 
detrimental to American society as a whole. 
B. A “Substantial Factor” Test Should Be Implemented in 
§ 633a Cases 
Rather than “but-for” causation, or a mixed-motive burden 
shifting analysis, this Note proposes that a “substantial factor” 
test be used in § 633a claims.  Under such a test, a plaintiff 
would have to prove that age was a “substantial factor” in the 
adverse employment action that occurred.  Age need not be the 
definitive reason, but it must be “material” to the events that 
transpired.133 
As previously discussed, in Gross, the Court outlined its 
“but-for” test as requiring proof that “age was the ‘reason’ that 
the employer decided to act.”134  Whether there are multiple 
 
130 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of Title V). 
131 Id. § 3(1). 
132 Id. § 3(2). 
133 See Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 
45, 49 (Minn. 1920) overruled on other grounds by Borsheim v. Great N. Ry. Co., 183 
N.W. 521 (1921); KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 41, at 265–68. 
134 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
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motives or not, “[a] plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence . . . that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged 
employer decision.”135  Even if evidence of age discrimination is 
present, it is deemed meaningless unless it is accompanied by 
proof that the adverse action happened because of said 
discrimination.  The burden never shifts to the defendant to show 
that the action would have happened regardless of age, so the 
plaintiff is never afforded the opportunity to show that other 
reasons given by the defendant for negative treatment are 
pretextual. 
The previously used Price Waterhouse test allowed a claim to 
proceed on a showing of a partly discriminatory “mixed-motive.”  
Under that test, so long as age was part of the reason for an 
adverse employment action, an ADEA claim could be brought, 
even if age was not a material factor.136  Since using this very low 
burden of proof unencumbered would give rise to claims based on 
only the slightest inference of discrimination, it was couched 
within a burden shifting framework.  After the plaintiff showed 
that age was a factor, the employer then had the opportunity to 
prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 
made the same decision even if it had not taken [age] into 
account.”137  Where the employer did not meet this burden, the 
plaintiff could prevail on his or her claim so long as age was a 
factor in the adverse action. 
Neither of these tests are apt for a § 633a analysis.  As 
previously discussed, statutory interpretation and policy 
considerations rule out the “but-for” test because § 623 and 
§ 633a are different in many substantial ways.138  Section 633a is 
broader and intended to protect against more than a “but-for” 
test allows.  Additionally, as Justice Breyer pointed out in his 
dissent in Gross, proving “but-for” causation in tort law is 
different than proving it in the discrimination context because 
the subjective intentions of individuals are often in question in 
 
135 Id. at 177–78. 
136 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). In applying the 
mixed-motive test in Gross, the district court instructed the jury that age was the 
cause of the firing so long as it “played a part or a role” in the decision. Gross, 557 
U.S. at 170–71. No amount of materiality was required. See id. 
137 Gross, 557 U.S. at 173–74. 
138 See supra Part III.A; Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 487–89 (2008). 
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discrimination cases.139  Tort claims are conducive to “reasonably 
objective scientific or commonsense theories of physical 
causation.”140  Discrimination claims, on the other hand, rely “not 
[on] physical forces, but the mind-related characterizations that 
constitute motive.”141  “But-for” causation places a heavy and 
often insurmountable burden on the plaintiff, who needs to show 
that but for what her discriminator was thinking, she would not 
have been treated adversely.142 
The “mixed-motive” analysis is also unsuitable for many of 
the reasons pointed out by the Court in Gross in reference to 
§ 623 claims.  First, the “mixed-motive” burden shifting analysis 
was intended for Title VII cases instead of ADEA cases and, 
therefore, should not automatically be applied between statutes.  
Title VII has been amended to provide for a “mixed-motive” 
analysis, while the ADEA has not.143  Second, practically 
speaking, Price Waterhouse’s mixed-motive burden shifting has 
proved to be unworkable.  The burden shifting framework has 
been difficult to explain to juries and has been the subject of 
much debate.144  Although § 633a is meant to be protective, an 
unencumbered “mixed-motive” standard would be too deferential.  
Some proof that discrimination is the foundation for the 
discriminatory action is needed.  Neither the “but-for” test nor 
the “mixed-motive” analysis appears to be the ideal solution to 
the current state of ambiguity. 
 
 
139 Gross, 557 U.S. at 190–91 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the differences 
between the facts that generally give rise to tort law causation and the facts in 
Gross). 
140 Id. at 190. It should be noted that subjective intentions often play a crucial 
role in tort law cases as well. Claims such as defamation, material 
misrepresentation, and fraud all rely on proof of intent. The issue is not necessarily 
that tort law is an inadequate means of analyzing subjective intent, as Justice 
Breyer implies, but more generally, that subjective intent is never an easy point to 
prove. 
141 Id. 
142 Acknowledging this onerous burden, tort law often looks to the materiality of 
an event in determining if it is a cause. Where two forces are sufficient to bring 
about a harm, a party may prove that one event was “material” to the outcome. The 
harm may have still occurred without the event, but the event was a “substantial 
factor” nonetheless. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 41, at 267–69. 
143 Gross, 557 U.S. at 174. 
144 Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991) (en 
banc) (Flaum, J., dissenting). 
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A substantial factor test would be more practical than Gross’ 
inflexible “but-for” requirement and Price Waterhouse’s lenient 
and unworkable “mixed-motive” burden shifting analysis.  While 
the language of § 633a does not specifically provide that age must 
be a “substantial factor,” such a test would nonetheless be 
compatible with the “any discrimination based on age” language.  
As previously discussed, the plain meaning of this language, as 
gleaned from dictionary definitions, is that age must be the 
foundation upon which the decision is based.145  Requiring 
something to be a “substantial factor” would ensure that it is an 
integral part of the decision, as the language of the statute 
requires.  Unlike the “but-for” test, age need not be the reason for 
the action.  So long as age is a substantial factor, the claim may 
be brought.  Unlike the “mixed-motive” analysis, age cannot just 
be a factor.  Rather, it must be a substantial factor in order for 
the claim to be brought. 
The causation principles of tort law could be drawn upon in 
formulating such a “substantial factor” analysis.  Many different 
areas of law borrow from tort law’s extensive causation 
jurisprudence.146  Among these are anti-trust,147 civil RICO,148 
and securities laws.149  In anti-trust law, causality analysis is 
based on the tort understanding of proximate cause.150  Antitrust 
law provides the framework, while tort law provides the 
substance of the causation analysis.  “The antitrust violation 
need not be the only cause of [an] injury, but it must be a 
material or substantial cause.”151  In civil RICO claims, the Court 
has used tort concepts of causation to explain what a plaintiff 
must prove in order to recover treble damages.  The need for a 
direct relationship between the conduct alleged and the injury 
asserted is dependent upon the tort theory of proximate cause.152   
 
 
145 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
146 See Michael A. Carrier, A Tort-Based Causation Framework for Antitrust 
Analysis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 991, 991–92 (2011). 
147 Stephen V. Bomse et al., Procedural Aspects of Private Antitrust Litigation, 
in 47TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR —DISTRIBUTION & MARKETING, at 
771 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 14482, 2008). 
148 Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1992). 
149 Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 344 (2005). 
150 Bomse et al., supra note 147 (“Causality analysis in antitrust cases borrows 
from tort law conceptions of proximate cause.”). 
151 Id. 
152 Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268–69. 
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In securities fraud claims, the Court requires a showing of 
damages proximately caused by deception.  As with RICO claims, 
this proximate cause standard borrows from tort law.153 
In Gross itself, the Supreme Court turned to tort law to help 
explain the “but-for” causation that it was requiring in the age 
discrimination context.154  The Court’s explanation that “[a]n act 
or omission is not regarded as a cause of an event if the 
particular event would have occurred without it” was borrowed 
from Prosser and Keeton on Torts.155  It therefore seems 
appropriate to borrow from tort law—and, for that matter, from 
the same treatise—to provide a test for § 633a as well. 
In tort law, under the substantial factor test “[t]he 
defendant’s conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material 
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about.”156  
Substantial factor is a self-explanatory phrase, not needing 
further clarification or jury instruction.157  Generally, a showing 
that something is a substantial factor will also be sufficient to 
prove “but-for” causation, but this is not always the case.158  
Something will be considered a “substantial factor” where “it [is] 
so indispensable a cause that without it the result would not 
have followed.”159  While this is similar to a “but-for” 
requirement, it is not exactly the same.  “But-for” is interpreted 
to mean that the adverse action would not have occurred unless 
discrimination was present, whereas “substantial factor” 
provides that discrimination was material to the adverse 
employment action, but not necessarily the deciding factor. 
A “substantial factor” test is preferable to a “but-for” test or 
“mixed-motive” analysis for a number of different reasons.  First, 
it ensures that Congress’ intent to afford more protection against 
a broad array of discrimination is satisfied without leading to 
preposterous results.  It does this by requiring that age be a 
material factor in the adverse employment action.  Something 
cannot be so trivial as to be immaterial, nor must it be so clear-
cut that it is determinative.  Second, the “substantial factor” test 
 
153 Dura Pharm., Inc., 544 U.S. at 344. 
154 See Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2009) (quoting 
KEETON ET AL., supra note 60). 
155 Id. at 177 (quoting KEETON ET AL., supra note 60). 
156 KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 41, at 267 (emphasis added). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 267–68. 
159 Id. at 268. 
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is not dependent upon anything in § 623, keeping the sections 
separate as Congress intended.  It is instead based solely on an 
independent reading of § 633a.  Third, a “substantial factor” test 
is consistent with long-held principles of tort law long adopted by 
the Court to resolve statutory ambiguity. 
Finally, a “substantial factor” test makes sense in light of the 
unique evidentiary problems presented by employment 
discrimination cases.  Such a test does not require a plaintiff to 
know things about her employer that would be impossible to 
discern.  Instead, it allows an employee to proceed wherever 
there is proof that age was a substantial factor regardless of 
other circumstances at play.  It holds federal employers to a 
higher burden than their non-federal counterparts in accordance 
with historical traditions.  The “substantial factor” approach 
could help solve many of the problems associated with both 
“mixed-motive” and “but-for” causation. 
In the hypothetical posed at the beginning of this Note,160 an 
employee was fired after leaving a review upon being told that 
the office would “be better off with someone younger.”  The 
reason given for her termination was insubordination, stemming 
from her storming out of the office without permission. 
Under the “mixed-motive” test, this employee would be able 
to meet her burden of proof at trial because the evidence suggests 
that age was a factor in her firing.  However, an employee armed 
with much less evidence would also be able to bring the same 
claim, opening the employer up to a great deal of liability over 
even trivial matters. 
Under the “but-for” test, this employee would not be able to 
meet her burden of proof at trial.  She would be required to show 
that “but-for” her age, she would not have been fired.  This would 
be difficult since age was not given as the reason for her firing, 
and her insubordination alone was reason enough to terminate 
her.  Even if she can prove that her employer had an underlying 
discriminatory intent, this is irrelevant unless her firing would 
not have occurred without it.  Her employer’s discrimination 
would be irrelevant. 
 
 
160 See supra Introduction (hypothesizing based on Harley v. Potter, 416 F. 
App’x 748 (10th Cir. 2011) cert. denied sub nom. Harley v. Donahoe, 132 S. Ct. 844 
(2011)). 
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Under a “substantial factor” test, the fired post office 
employee could succeed in meeting her burden of proof at trial.  
She would have to show that her age was a substantial factor in 
her termination.  Evidence of her supervisor’s derogatory 
statements about her would likely suffice to meet this burden.  
The “substantial factor” test would let the employee prove that 
her supervisor’s biased attitude toward her based on her age was 
material to her termination.  Although she may not be able to 
show that she would not have been fired “but-for” her age, she 
would still be able to win because of the materiality of the 
discrimination to the end result.  Of these three tests, the 
“substantial factor” test would therefore bring about the most 
just result and provide employees with a reasonable degree of 
protection, as intended by the ADEA. 
CONCLUSION 
Age discrimination is not an issue that is likely to go away 
any time soon; the average age of the American worker will 
continue to rise for years to come.  The measures in place to deter 
age discrimination in the workplace are as important today as 
they were when the ADEA was enacted forty years ago.  It is 
crucial that courts interpret the various sections of the ADEA 
consistently, so that plaintiffs know what is required of them 
when bringing an ADEA claim.  While the tests for each section 
need not be the same, they should each be distinctly established.  
Although the Supreme Court took an important step toward 
causational clarity through its § 623 interpretation in Gross, the 
§ 633a causation requirement is no clearer today than it was 
before Gross was decided. 
Because of the textual differences between the two sections, 
as well as the different policies in play distinguishing federal 
employees from their non-federal counterparts, Gross should not 
be extended to § 633a, as several courts have already held.  
Rather than the § 623 “but-for” causation requirement, courts 
should consider a “substantial factor” test, as already developed 
and proved effective in tort law. 
Because of the importance of this issue and the unfortunate 
continued prevalence of age discrimination in the workplace, a 
determinative legislative or judicial solution to the problems 
described above should occur in the near future.  Until then, 
§ 633a causation remains a Gross mess. 
